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Abstract 
 
Some extreme weather events may be more likely to affect climate change beliefs than others, in 
part because schema individuals possess for different events could vary in encouraging such 
links. Using a representative sample of U.S. adults and geocoded National Weather Service data, 
we examine how a range of extreme weather event categories relate to climate change beliefs, 
and the degree to which individuals’ self-reported experiences are shaped by their political views 
across event types. For tornado, hurricane, and flood events, we find no link with beliefs. For 
polar vortex and drought events, we find that although self-reported experience is linked with 
climate beliefs, reporting of these experiences is influenced by political identity and partisan 
news exposure. These findings underscore a limited role for extreme weather experiences in 
climate beliefs, and show that events more open to interpretation, such as droughts and polar 
vortex disturbances, are most likely to be seen through a partisan lens.  
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 Low levels of certainty about climate change may stem from the difficulty of 
experiencing it directly. A developing literature investigates the impact of exposure to 
anomalous weather patterns on beliefs about climate change. Researchers are interested in these 
effects because experiential learning can vividly render otherwise abstract risks concrete (Howe 
et al., 2013). Rather than relying on statistics about climate change, individuals can refer to their 
lived experience.  
A series of studies have linked fluctuations in local temperatures to climate change 
beliefs (Egan & Mullin, 2012; Hamilton & Stampone, 2013; Zaval et al., 2014). By scientific 
standards, however, local temperature fluctuations are poor evidence of climate change (Egan & 
Mullin, 2012; Zaval et al., 2014). Conversely, because climatologists have noted climate 
change’s contribution to events such as hurricanes and droughts (Trenberth, 2012), such events 
are more acceptable evidence of climate change (Deryugina, 2013). For this reason, extreme 
weather events may serve as “teachable moments” about climate change (Howe et al., 2013, p. 
12). Personally experiencing these events and making sense of them may result in updating 
beliefs about climate change. In this paper, we focus on five extreme weather events (polar 
vortex disturbance,1 drought, tornado, flood, and hurricane) and evaluate how they relate to 
climate change beliefs. 
We also examine factors that could influence how individuals integrate personal weather 
experiences with pre-existing schema (Nisbet, 2011) -- including education (Tichenor et al., 
1970), partisanship (McCright, Dunlap, & Xiao, 2014), and partisan media exposure (Feldman et 
al., 2014). Finally, the effects of different categories of weather events may vary because mental 
                                               
1 We use the colloquial term “polar vortex” for the extreme cold events stemming from an influx of Arctic air over 
the continental United States in 2014 and 2015. It should be noted, however, that this usage differs from the 
definition used by meteorologists and climatologists (Albon, 2014; Fischetti, 2014). In the scientific community, the 
polar vortex refers to planetary-scale high-latitude circumpolar circulation (see Frauenfeld & Davis, 2003). 
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models for some types of weather events may be more connected schematically to mental models 
of climate change (Weber & Stern, 2011), and may vary depending on whether we analyze self-
reported or objective event exposure.  
We find that reported experience with polar vortex and drought events is related to 
climate beliefs. These associations are often moderated by education and political orientation, 
but partisan media use rarely affects these experience-belief links. Inclusion of objective 
indicators or spatial variables shows that these two event categories are also subject to political 
identity-derived bias in self-reporting. This set of results suggests extreme weather plays a 
limited role in climate beliefs, and worldviews can alter the subjective experience of certain 
events. In the following sections, we review the literature on extreme weather and climate 
attitudes, potential moderators of these experiential effects, and biased reporting of these 
experiences. 
Extreme weather events and climate change attitudes 
Skepticism surrounding climate change remains widespread in the U.S., particularly among 
conservatives (Egan & Mullin, 2017). Americans attach a low level of issue salience to climate change 
(Egan & Mullin, 2017), including those who embrace the scientific consensus. Combined, 
conservatives’ skepticism and liberals’ apathy pose challenges to forming an effective response 
(Hornsey et al., 2016). Personal experience with the effects of climate change may influence public 
attitudes, however. Such experiences may reduce the psychological distance that characterizes how 
many relate to climate change (Spence, Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2012). Because of the asymmetry in how 
liberals and conservatives process information relating to the issue, the benefit of extreme weather 
events may be to prioritize climate action among liberals, rather than to persuade conservatives (Zhou, 
2016).  
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A few studies have examined the link between experiencing an extreme weather event 
and climate change beliefs. For example, Carlton et al. (2016) found attitudinal effects of the 
2012 Midwestern U.S. drought, as did Demski et al. (2017) for the 2013-14 U.K. winter floods. 
Rudman et al. (2013) found that students linked the personal negative impact of Superstorm 
Sandy, but not Hurricane Irene, to greater implicit preference for a “green” politician.  
In a broader approach, Konisky et al. (2016) tested the relationship between exposure to 
certain types of extreme weather and climate change concern. They found a modest relationship 
between experience and concern, which was limited to recent events. The study used a measure 
that pooled a variety of extreme weather forms connected to climate change, including “warmer 
temperatures, more heat waves and drought, increased precipitation, increased tropical storms, 
and sea-level rise” (2016, p. 536). This varied measure of extreme weather exposure may not 
fully capture the ways in which such events may influence public opinion. In particular, some 
extreme events may affect climate change beliefs differently than others. 
Rather than looking at extreme weather as a whole, we propose to look at categories of 
extreme weather events independently. As Petty and Cacioppo (1986, p. 165) write, “one of the 
most important variables affecting information processing activity is the extent to which a person 
has an organized structure of knowledge (schema) concerning an issue.” One way that different 
types of weather events may lead to differential impacts on climate change beliefs, then, is based 
on the experiencer’s existing schema, or underlying belief structure, for each phenomenon. 
Schema are dynamic and frequently updated based upon new experiences and information 
(Wadsworth, 1984); typically, new information is accommodated within existing schema rather 
than resulting in new schema. This can result in poor schematic representations of new events 
related to climate change because individuals are inclined to connect these observations with 
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“existing local pressures for which schemas had been developed” (Kuruppu & Liverman, 2011, 
p. 10). In other words, it is not clear whether new events will be schematically connected to other 
weather events that are not closely tied to climate change, or whether they will be schematically 
related to climate change. For this reason, some extreme weather schemas may be more 
compatible with climate change than others (Weber & Stern, 2011).  
Due to lack of research in this domain, we are ultimately agnostic about specific 
differences across events. For example, when individuals encounter an unfamiliar event, such as 
a polar vortex disturbance, causal information should be particularly salient. Because novel 
phenomena like polar vortex disturbances call for explanation among both the media and the 
public, studies such as Kim et al. (2014), which attributed the destabilized polar jet stream (and 
attendant extreme cold in the continental U.S.) to warmer oceans and Arctic sea-ice loss, gained 
traction in media reports (e.g., Holthaus, 2014). The under-construction schema for polar vortex 
disturbances may place this information centrally, as individuals form a cognitive network 
around the new concept (Ahn, Brewer, & Mooney, 1992). This could allow polar vortex 
experiences to exert greater influence over climate beliefs. However, it is also possible that initial 
centrality of climate change in the polar vortex mental model could lead to political identity-
derived bias in perception of the phenomenon (e.g., Howard, 2014; Schlossberg, 2015).  
Individuals may have well-developed schemas for other events (Kuruppu & Liverman, 
2011), making them resistant to a new climate change association, but particularly intense cases 
(e.g., a 100-year flood, or record-breaking hurricane) might lead to a tipping point that produces 
an attributional shift in the underlying cognitive schema of the event. It is unclear, however, if 
some types of events more easily reach such a tipping-point stage than others.  
Selected Events  
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Previous research using geospatial weather data has pooled all manifestations of 
extremity into one measure (Konisky et al., 2016). Because we are interested in the way in which 
different events are processed and connected to climate change, we focus on a variety of discrete 
event types. Our study builds on prior work regarding public perceptions that focused on 
hurricanes (Rudman et al., 2013), tornadoes (Leiserowitz, 2004), drought (Carlton et al., 2016), 
and floods (Demski et al., 2017). Both climatologists (Peterson et al., 2012; Trenberth, 2012) and 
the media (Desmki et al., 2017) have attributed increased likelihood or intensity of these events 
to climate change, albeit with varied degrees of certainty (Trenberth, 2012). Despite the 
connections made in the media, however, people learn about each category in contexts without 
an explicit link to climate change. 
Because of our interest in the schema individuals use to contextualize weather 
experiences, we also examine a novel event: polar vortex disturbances. Relatively new to public 
consciousness, the term “polar vortex” became a part of lay vocabularies in the U.S. after an 
extreme cold event in January 2014 received extensive media coverage (Shepherd, 2016; Waugh 
et al., 2017). The concept of a polar vortex disturbance was used to describe a low-pressure zone 
surrounding the Polar Region that pushed arctic air into Canada and the U.S.2 A similar polar 
vortex event resulted in record low temperatures in the U.S. in February 2015. Polar vortex was 
likely a novel concept given the dearth of coverage of the term prior to the 2014 event. By 
analyzing the possible linkage between climate change and polar vortex, we can assess whether 
the two were connected in people's minds.3 
                                               
2 We note that because we examine the public’s experience with and interpretation of these events, we again refer 
here to the popular understanding of polar vortex disturbances as covered in media reports, which does not fully 
align with the term’s usage in the scientific community. 
 
3 It is important to note how the interpretation and effects of polar vortex disturbances may differ from cold snaps in 
general (e.g., Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014). While both types of events have similar outcomes on a physical level, 
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As an overall set, the events we selected range across experiential qualities of extremity 
(e.g., aridity, cold, precipitation, wind speed) and the likely existing knowledge structures.  
Moderators of Experiential Effects 
Several factors can influence how individuals integrate personal weather experiences 
with their preexisting schema (Nisbet, 2011). Partisanship and ideology structure beliefs about 
climate and related policy, particularly in the U.S. (e.g., Dunlap, McCright, & Yarosh, 2016; 
Hornsey et al., 2016; McCright, Dunlap, & Xiao, 2014). It is thus not surprising that individuals 
often see weather through a partisan lens (e.g., Borick & Rabe, 2017).  
Education’s role may be more complicated. Educated individuals are often better 
equipped to find, make sense of, and retain new information (Tichenor et al., 1970). Better 
educated individuals may be more likely to encounter and contextualize attributional information 
about extreme weather. Initially, this may seem to contradict Egan and Mullin (2012), who found 
that those with a high school education or less were strongly influenced by recent temperatures, 
while those with advanced degrees were essentially unaffected. The authors attribute the result to 
differences in the tendency to rely on heuristics (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), with short-term local 
temperature changes serving as poor evidence for the educated and as an appealing heuristic for 
the less-educated. For this same reason, we would expect that the direction of the effect would 
flip for events that constitute stronger evidence. Extreme weather events arguably meet this 
requirement, as climate scientists attribute their increasing extremity to anthropogenic climate 
                                               
polar vortex disturbances may differ from cold snaps in the minds of members of public -- as something new -- 
because the event was treated as such in media coverage (e.g., Holthaus, 2014), which stressed the event’s causality.  
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change (Otto, 2017; Stott, 2016;), and media reports have begun to convey such information 
(Captsick & Pidgeon, 2014).4 
 Finally, research has demonstrated that media use is connected to beliefs about climate 
change (e.g. Zhao, 2009). During the five years that serve as the focal point of our study, media 
frequently talked about extreme weather events and climate change.5 Partisan media, in 
particular, can influence beliefs about climate change, with over-time measurement suggesting a 
causal relationship (Feldman et al., 2014). Because partisan news differs in its presentation of 
climate change, attending to such media enhances “belief gaps” between liberal Democrats and 
conservative Republicans in the U.S. (Nisbet et al., 2015; Veenstra et al., 2014). Because 
partisan news reinforces its audience’s attachment to their political identities (Levendusky, 
2013), it can influence how evidence is perceived (Jerit & Barabas, 2012) – potentially even if 
that evidence is personal experience. Partisan news exposure may result in discounting or 
amplifying the connection between extreme weather and climate change, depending on its slant.  
Biased Reporting 
Evidence of biased recall is fairly common in perceptions of extreme temperatures (e.g., 
Hamilton et al., 2016a; Howe, 2018; Howe & Leiserowitz, 2013; McCright et al., 2014; but see 
                                               
4It should be further noted that education moderates the effect of party on beliefs, enhancing adherence to group 
norms. Compared to those with less education, better-educated Democrats are more likely to believe in, and better-
educated Republicans more likely to reject, climate change (Hamilton, 2011).  
 
5 Using the Factiva database, we searched between June 1, 2010 and May 31, 2015. Of the articles mentioning 
global warming or climate change in The New York Times, Washington Post, or Wall Street Journal (top circulating 
newspapers), 384 articles mentioned flood, 81 articles mentioned tornado, 512 mentioned hurricane, 519 mentioned 
drought, and 21 mentioned polar vortex. Of the programs mentioning global warming or climate change in Fox 
News programs Hannity, Special Report with Brett Baier, and Your World with Neil Cavuto (the conservative 
sources available in the database for the period of analysis), 81 mentioned flood, 46 tornado, 95 hurricane, 40 
drought, and 1 polar vortex. Of the programs mentioning global warming or climate change in MSNBC programs 
Hard Ball, The Rachel Maddow Show, and The Last Word with Lawrence O'Donnell (the liberal sources available 
in the database for the period of analysis, note Last Word started 9/27/10), 32 mentioned flood, 12 tornado, 56 
hurricane, 17 drought, and 0 polar vortex. These results show that those attentive to the media would have heard 
connections between these extreme events and climate change, albeit with different focuses and intensities across 
the events and media outlets. 
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Ripberger et al., 2017). Less work has examined biased recall for the more specific extreme 
events that we examine here. A few recent studies show political identity influence on extreme 
event reporting, particularly when survey respondents are asked to identify trends (Hamilton et 
al., 2016b; Shao & Goidel, 2016). Although precipitation and flooding have increased in recent 
decades in New Hampshire, for example, only 35% of the state’s residents believe these have 
increased, with a 26-point gap between liberals and conservatives (Hamilton et al., 2016b).  
Although not examining the influence of political identity, Howe et al. (2014) analyze 
reporting accuracy for those experiencing hurricane, tornado, and drought. The authors find that 
the public accurately recalls discrete, fast-onset events like tornadoes and hurricanes well, but 
struggles to perceive drought. Drought events are slow-onset with long time horizons, extend 
over broad geographical areas, and are defined differently by experts. For these reasons, we 
might expect droughts and other events more open to interpretation to be more subject to biased 
reporting driven by political worldviews or partisan media exposure.  
Hypotheses 
Because extreme weather events provide experiential evidence, we hypothesize: 
H1. Extreme weather experiences will increase the odds of holding climate change 
beliefs in line with the scientific community’s.   
We expect that this relationship will be moderated by individuals’ characteristics. 
Educated individuals have a greater ability to extract information from media coverage and 
contextualize new experiences within more sophisticated schema. Additionally, these events 
should be especially likely to affect those predisposed to make the link, namely those with a 
liberal / Democratic political orientation: 
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H2. Relationships between extreme weather and climate change beliefs will be stronger 
among those with a) higher education and b) more liberal / Democratic political orientation. 
 
Similarly, we expect that partisan media consumption conditions the association between 
personal experience and beliefs, such that: 
H3. Relationships between extreme weather and climate change beliefs will be stronger 
among those exposed to liberal news media, and weaker among those exposed to conservative 
news media. 
We also expect that each extreme weather experience will be processed differently 
depending on individuals’ existing schemas. However, because existing research in this area is 
nonexistent, we pose a research question: 
RQ1. How, if at all, do these relationships vary across weather event categories?  
Finally, we analyze whether climate change beliefs are predicted by objective or self-
reported experiences of weather events.  
RQ2. How, if at all, do self-reported and objective indicators differ in their association 
with climate beliefs? 
We then examine what predicts self-reported experiences, controlling for objective 
experiences, proposing that more ambiguous (drought) and more novel (polar vortex) weather 
events will be more subject to biased reporting driven by political orientations and media diets. 
H4. For drought and polar vortex, political orientation and partisan news media 
exposure will predict reported experience above and beyond objective or spatial measures.  
Methods 
Data 
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This study employs previously unpublished survey data from the Pew American Trends 
Panel (ATP), a national, probability-based online panel of adults in the United States. Adults 
who use the internet participated in the panel via self-administered Web surveys, and adults who 
do not use the internet participated via computer-assisted telephone interviewing or mail. Data 
employed in this study come from the ATP’s wave 11, fielded from June 2 to June 29, 2015. By 
wave 11, 77.1% of the 5,338 panelists were still active. In total, 3,057 ATP members completed 
the survey. Taking into account the response rate to the probability-based recruitment survey and 
percent of those respondents who agreed to participate in the panel, the cumulative response rate 
for wave 11 was 3.3%.  
Data for objective weather experience comes from the Storm Events Database compiled 
by NOAA's National Weather Service (NWS). The data include droughts, floods, tornadoes, and 
hurricanes as measured by each events’ Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) county 
location code from 2010-2015. The NWS records were matched to the FIPS county codes for the 
ATP survey respondents.6  
Measures 
Climate change beliefs. Three global warming beliefs served as outcome variables. 
Warming belief was measured dichotomously; 59.2% of respondents agreed that “there is solid 
evidence that the average temperature on earth has been getting warmer over the past few 
decades.” Of respondents who agreed with this statement, 74.2% agreed that the Earth was 
                                               
6 For objective drought and tornado experience, we matched respondent FIPS with any FIPS having experienced a 
drought or tornado between 2010-2015, according to NWS. For flood experience, we included any FIPS 
experiencing flood, flash flood, coastal flood, or lakeshore flood between 2010-2015, according to NWS. For 
hurricane experience, we matched respondent FIPS with any FIPS having experienced a hurricane between 2010-
2015, according to NWS; we also included any FIPS that experienced extreme weather directly associated with 
Hurricanes Sandy, Arthur, Isaac, or Irene according to the description of the event by NWS. These included events 
such as tropical storms, storm surges, and high wind, among others.  
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warming mostly due to “human activity such as burning fossil fuels,” providing an 
anthropogenic belief measure. Finally, 67.3% of respondents indicated that the statement “most 
scientists believe that global warming is occurring,” was more accurate than “most scientists 
believe that global warming is not occurring” or “most scientists are unsure about whether global 
warming is occurring or not,” providing a scientific consensus belief measure. Each belief is 
considered in keeping with consensus among the scientific community (IPCC, 2014). 
Extreme weather experiences. Self-reported extreme weather experiences were 
measured dichotomously, asking whether respondents had experienced each severe event in the 
past five years: 21.7% of respondents reported a polar vortex experience, 41.0% a drought, 
19.8% a tornado, 29.3% flood, and 16.7% a hurricane.  
Based on NWS objective measures, 21.3% lived in a county where a flood was recorded 
over the time period, 25.3% a tornado, 4.3% a hurricane, and 4.4% drought. We take a different 
approach with the polar vortex disturbances due to their widespread nature (affecting air 
temperatures in 42 states in 2014, for example [AccuWeather, 2014]), and the lack of NWS 
records of their effects. We instead look at the effects of self-reported experience using U.S. 
Census regions to examine spatial variation.  
 Moderators. Education, political orientations, and media exposure were examined as 
moderators. Respondents had a median education of a Bachelor’s degree. 27.5% reported being 
very liberal or liberal, 38.7% moderate, and 33.8% conservative or very conservative. 50.8% 
affiliated with or leaned Democrat, 41.7% affiliated with or leaned Republican, and 7.5% leaned 
toward neither.  
 We employ partisanship as our focal political orientation for interaction terms (e.g., 
Zhou, 2016) in part due to widespread “ideological innocence” (Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017). That 
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said, we also examine ideology, along with a combined party-ideology measure7 (e.g., Dunlap et 
al., 2016; Kahan, 2015; Ripberger et al., 2017; Feldman & Hart, 2018), in supplementary 
analyses. For parsimony, we report the results using partisanship, and footnote any significant 
disparities from the alternate specifications.  
 Media exposure was measured with additive scales. Respondents were provided an 
inventory of sources and asked to indicate which they “got news from in the past week.” Liberal 
news consisted of: Huffington Post, Real Time with Bill Maher, MSNBC, Daily Show, and Last 
Week Tonight with John Oliver (M = .64, SD = .93). Conservative news consisted of: Fox News 
(cable channel), Drudge Report, Breitbart, Rush Limbaugh Show (radio), and Sean Hannity 
Show (radio) (M = .59, SD = .78). These scales were also standardized to z-scores.  
Controls. Each analysis also controlled for age (M = 52.69, SD = 17.05), gender (51.7% 
female), and race (79.0% white, 7.4% black, 7.0% Hispanic). In robustness checks, we also 
include Census region as a spatial control variable.  
Analytical Framework 
To test our hypotheses and research question, we fitted binary logistic regression models 
for our three dichotomous climate change belief variables.  Our models first included self-reports 
for each extreme weather event type. Next, we predicted climate beliefs by objective indicators, 
and then added the self-reports and objective indicators concurrently. Finally, we addressed 
reporting bias with follow up analyses predicting self-report by political variables while 
accounting for objective indicators or spatial variables.  
                                               
7 Partisanship and ideology are similarly correlated with our dependent variables. Party and ideology, respectively, 
correlate with belief that Earth is warming (r = -.46, p < .001; r = -.47 p < .001), that humans are the cause (r = -.32, 
p < .001; r = -.34, p < .001) and that scientists agree (r = -.39, p < .001; r = -.40, p < .001). Thus, we averaged these 
5-pt. ideology and party responses (r = .61; M = 2.94, SD = 1.20) and standardized to a z-score to facilitate 
interpretation (Kahan et al., 2017).   
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Results 
Self-Reports 
The first logistic regression modeled the belief that climate change is occurring (Table 1, 
Column 1). Self-reported polar vortex (Exp(B) = 1.37, p < .01) and drought experiences (Exp(B) 
= 1.48, p < .001) were significantly associated with the belief that Earth is warming. The other 
extreme weather experiences were not significant predictors. The next analysis modeled 
anthropogenic belief (Table 1, Column 2). Polar vortex experience (Exp(B) = 1.56, p < .01) and 
drought experience (Exp(B) = 1.28, p < .05) were significantly associated with anthropogenic 
belief; the other extreme weather experience variables were not. The third model looked at 
scientific consensus belief (Table 1, Column 3). Again, polar vortex (Exp(B) = 1.44, p < .01) and 
drought experiences (Exp(B) = 1.22, p < .05) were significantly associated with belief in 
scientific consensus.  
Table 1 
These tests showed consistent relationships between self-reported experiences of polar 
vortex or drought and climate change beliefs in line with the scientific community’s. We focus 
on these in our subsequent analyses. The next models examined the potential for heterogeneous 
effects of these two types of extreme weather (Table 2).8 9 
                                               
8 When substituting either ideology or a party-ideology averaged term in the place of party, there are a few instances 
of shifting effect sizes. While party and ideology interact with self-reported drought experience to predict belief that 
the Earth is warming, (party Exp(B) = .89, p < .05; ideology Exp(B) = .77 p < .05), the average term’s interaction 
was only marginally significant at Exp(B) = .81, p = .055. Swapping ideology in place of party also produces a 
significant interaction with polar vortex experience in predicting belief that humans are causing climate change, 
Exp(B) = .59, p < .01. In general, these differences support our takeaway that partisanship and ideology moderate 
associations between self-reported drought/polar vortex experience and climate beliefs.  
 
9 We conducted a series of supplementary analyses. First, we tested a 4-point ordinal dependent variable for climate 
change belief that combined our warming and anthropogenic belief measures. We also modeled potential 
interactions for those weather event categories that did not produce main effects – hurricane, drought, and flood – 
with education, party/ideology, and liberal/conservative media. These interactions were not significant. See 
Appendix Tables A1-A2. 
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Table 2 
The relationships between polar vortex experience and warming (Exp(B) = 1.21, p < .01) 
and consensus (Exp(B) = 1.19, p < .05) beliefs strengthened as education increased. Polar vortex 
experience’s association with warming belief was also stronger among Democrats than 
Republicans (Exp(B) = .85, p < .05). Drought experience’s association with warming belief 
(Exp(B) = .85, p < .05) was stronger among Democrats than Republicans. 
To address H3, measures of liberal and conservative-leaning news use were added to 
each model, along with their interactions with polar vortex and drought experience (Appendix 
Table A3). We find one significant interaction: Conservative news use was associated with a 
weaker link between polar vortex experience and belief that the Earth is warming (Ex(B) = .68, p 
< .01). 10  
Objective Indicators 
 We replicate these analyses with objective indicators of hurricane, tornado, flood, and 
drought. We do not include an objective indicator of polar vortex disturbance, as the technical 
geographic distribution of these atmospheric disturbances is too large to be discriminant. We find 
that none of these objective indicators of extreme weather events are associated with climate 
beliefs (Table 3). We also split the objective indicators between recent (2014-15) and more 
distant events (2010-2013), as shown in Appendix Table A4, showing one difference: 
Respondents living in an area exposed to a hurricane in the more recent time period were more 
likely to believe the Earth is warming (Exp(B) = 2.08, p < .05). 
Table 3 
                                               
10 We also include spatial controls (US Census Regions) as a robustness check for our self-reported experience 
models, with no substantive difference in results. 
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 Next, we include self-report and objective indicators simultaneously (Table 4). These 
models show that the relationships between self-reported drought experience and climate beliefs 
persist with the inclusion of the objective drought indicator, suggesting biased reporting. 
Following this finding, we address potential sources of differential reporting for drought and 
polar vortex.11  
Table 4 
Biased Recall  
Polar Vortex. Because of the geographically dispersed, atmospheric nature of polar 
vortex disturbances, we look at identity-driven differential experience reporting while accounting 
for U.S. Census region. 12 First, we modeled reported polar vortex experience with U.S. Census 
regions as controls and the West held out as the reference category. This model showed 
Republicans were less likely to report polar vortex experience, Exp(B) = .91, p < .01, while those 
exposed to liberal media were more likely, Exp(B) = 1.15, p <.01, controlling for region of 
residence (full results in Appendix, Table A5).  
We then looked at bias within regions, as the severity of the events and related media 
coverage varied widely (Albon, 2014; Hamik et al., 2016; Lipman, 2015; Overland et al., 2015; 
Wolter et al., 2015). To do so, we examined predictors of reporting among respondents in the 
Northeast, Midwest, South, and West separately, using logistic regression for each. Results 
                                               
11 Although there was no difference in how self-reported and objective measures of flood, hurricane, or tornado 
experience related to climate change, we ran additional tests predicting self-reports while controlling for objective 
indicators. We find two potential sources of political bias, with liberal media use predicting flood self-report above 
and beyond our objective measure, Exp(B) = 1.13, p < 01, and party predicting hurricane self-report above our 
objective measure, Exp(B) = .92, p < .05. .  
 
12 We again performed robustness tests for our party/ideology measure in our models of biased reporting. There was 
no effect in the model predicting drought self-report. In the four regional polar vortex models, there was one 
distinction in using the combined measure in the place of party: In the Midwest model, party was only marginally 
significant, Exp(B) = .89, p = .053 vs. Exp(B) = .79, p = .022 when using the combined measure. 
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(shown in Table 5) show significant effects of political variables on reporting, particularly in 
regions where the effects of polar vortex disturbances may have been more open to 
interpretation.  
In the South and Midwest, Republicans were significantly less likely to report the 
experience (Exp(B) = .82, p < .01; Exp(B) = .89, p =. 053). In the Midwest and West, liberal 
media exposure increased the likelihood of reporting (Exp(B) = 1.25, p < .05; Exp(B) = 1.42, p < 
.05). In the Northeast, which bore the worst of the 2014-15 polar vortex disturbances and 
received a great deal of the related media coverage, none of the political variables predicted 
experience reporting in the final model.  
Table 5 
Drought. Finally, we address bias in drought reporting as seen in Table 6. An initial 
model shows that self-reported experience is predicted by the objective indicator,13 as well as 
liberal news exposure (Exp(B) = 1.24, p < .01). Liberal news exposure does not moderate the 
link between objective and subjective experience, however, as seen in column 2.  
Table 6 
Discussion 
In this study, we combine nationally representative survey data and NWS storm event 
data disaggregated by event category to explore how the public perceives and makes sense of 
various extreme weather events in relation to climate change. We find that self-reported 
experience with drought and polar vortex disturbances are associated with climate beliefs more 
in line with the scientific community’s, and these relationships are often intensified by education 
and political worldviews. However, the addition of objective weather indicators in the case of 
                                               
13 Splitting the objective indicator by recent/distant drought events shows that both independently predict self-
report. 
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drought, and analysis of reporting propensity with spatial controls in the case of polar vortex 
suggest both experiences are shaped by politics.  
Those exposed to liberal media are more likely to report drought experience, and our 
objective indicator of drought is not associated with climate beliefs. Similarly, liberal media 
exposure increases the odds of reporting polar vortex experience in the American West and 
Midwest, while partisanship and ideology predict reporting in the South and Midwest. Political 
variables played little role in reporting for those hit hardest by the media-event polar vortex 
disturbances of 2014 and 2015 in the Northeast. These findings suggest tempering optimism 
about extreme weather as teachable moments (Howe et al., 2013). In broad terms, the limited 
long-term effects of extreme weather events shown here support Konisky et al. (2016), who 
found any effects to be short lived; our results show limited effects across event categories. As 
Hornsey et al. (2016, p. 622) sum up, “many intuitively appealing variables (such as [...] 
experience of extreme weather events) [are] overshadowed in predictive power by values, 
ideologies, worldviews and political orientation.” 
Although events do not appear to lead to differential influence on climate beliefs as 
hypothesized, the schema of certain events may instead cause existing climate beliefs and the 
political identities from which they stem to inform subjective experience. Perhaps because 
drought and polar vortex are less discrete experiences, and may be easily linked with climate 
change, we see political bias in reporting. Science communicators explicitly connected polar 
vortex events with climate change (Borenstein, 2014; Walsh, 2014), and such events are 
associated with polar regions, which are prominent in climate change discourse (Hamilton, 2008; 
Hamilton & Lemcke-Stampone, 2014), and so may fit a widely held mental model of climate 
change. Drought may fit more clearly with conceptions of global warming (Borick & Rabe, 
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2017). In both cases, the ease of the connection may have promoted the salience of the 
experience for those predisposed to be concerned the Earth’s changing climate.  
Although we suspected that media use would in part determine how individuals 
processed weather experiences, we did not fully anticipate how. Media use rarely moderated 
experience’s link to climate beliefs, but it did bias whether individuals reported ambiguous event 
experiences at all. Event attribution is a relatively new domain of climate science (Otto, 2017; 
Stott, 2016), and until recently climatologists have been wary of causally tying discrete events to 
climate change (Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014; Trenberth, 2012). As such, these links may only be 
beginning to saturate news coverage (Diffenbaugh, 2017), particularly as scientists are able to 
make such attributions more quickly (Duhaime-Ross, 2018). For example, though we found little 
evidence that hurricane experiences affect climate beliefs, we did find a modest effect of more 
recent hurricanes in our time split model. This may suggest that communicative efforts to 
connect extreme weather events to climate change are becoming more effective. While we 
cannot test this possibility here, it would be a worthwhile endeavor for future research.  
Climate change presents a unique set of communicative challenges, and our study adds to 
these concerns. We show that perceived, rather than objective, measures of some extreme 
weather events correlate with climate change beliefs. The link was particularly evident among 
those with more education and those holding more liberal/Democratic beliefs. Strategic use of 
extreme weather to discuss climate change thus has three distinct challenges: It must help people 
to recognize their experience of these events, to overcome their partisan tendencies to 
contextualize them, and to inform those with less education about links to climate change. 
Another challenge is that climate change tends to not be a highly prioritized political issue, even 
among those who are very concerned about climate change. As we find evidence that experience 
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of less discrete extreme events are processed through partisan lenses, science communicators 
need to consider how connecting these events to climate change will affect both concern and 
political issue prioritization by the public. It might be that public prioritization of climate change 
mitigation would be dependent on specific extreme weather events, and not all events will 
benefit from emphasis on the direct connection to climate change.   
Although this study provides a comprehensive look at different weather events using a 
national probability sample and objective weather indicators, it is important to note that the 
cross-sectional nature of the data prohibits us from drawing causal conclusions (although 
proposed relationships have been in evidence in research using longitudinal data e.g., Konisky et 
al., 2016).14 Several measurement issues in this study are also worth noting. The survey did not 
define polar vortex for respondents, or explain that the definition of drought varies even among 
experts.15 Future research should evaluate the public’s understanding of these terms, and whether 
defining these terms changes the relationships documented here.  
We also asked about the experience of extreme weather events over the past five years; 
whether the results would differ over different time frames is unclear. Our analysis of more 
recent objective experiences offers some suggestion that this is an important consideration (It 
should also be noted that polar vortex disturbances became national news only in the later period 
                                               
14 Panel data would be especially useful to shed additional light on polar vortex disturbances, for which due to a lack 
of an objective indicator we cannot rule out some causal effect in spite of politically motivated reporting. 
 
15 Because differing forms of drought – meteorological, agricultural, hydrological, and social-economic –begin and 
end at different times, any measure of drought is unlikely to align perfectly with public understanding. Only severe 
droughts are included as extreme events in the NWS database (events rated at D2 - D4 on the Drought Monitor scale 
east of the Rocky Mountains, and those rated at D3- D4 west of the Rockies). Therefore, it is possible that the liberal 
news exposure bias in drought reporting may mean these respondents are more sensitive to the weakest 
classification of droughts. In other words, because drought is difficult to recognize and takes time, the time to 
recognition may be moderated by news consumption. However, the long time-horizon of our analysis helps account 
for this possibility. 
 
. 
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of the time frame under study, 2014-15). Similarly, we take a big-picture look at event category 
effects rather than those of specific events. However, particularly intense, singular exemplar 
events might be most capable of influencing attitudes (Rudman et al., 2013). Further, the 
objective measures were matched to the location data available for survey respondents, but we 
did not have insight into whether respondents moved or spent vacations in affected regions, for 
example. This slippage could have obscured our ability to find significant effects for the 
objective measures.   
Finally, how extreme weather experiences are connected to climate change beliefs may 
vary by other factors outside the scope of this study, such as class, gender, and race (e.g., Cutler 
2015; Cutler, 2016). Socio-economic factors have systemic influences on attitudes towards 
science, environmental hazards, and perceptions of risk (Finucane et al., 2000). Future research 
should further explore how extreme weather affects minority groups or susceptible populations 
differently, and how they perceive the connection to climate change. 
Conclusion  
Our analyses suggest that extreme weather events have little long-term impact on climate 
beliefs, and political views may shape the salience of more ambiguous weather phenomena. If 
some extreme weather events do offer a window of change, it may depend on the nature of the 
preexisting frames surrounding the class of event, and these focusing events may be better suited 
to increasing salience among liberals than to converting conservatives.  
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Table 1. Extreme Weather (Self-Reports) and Climate Change Beliefs 
 
 …Is Occurring …Due to Humans Scientists Agree 
 B S.E. Exp(B) p B S.E. Exp(B) p B S.E. Exp(B) p 
             
Age  -0.01 0.00 0.99 0.030 -0.01 0.00 0.99 0.004 -0.01 0.00 0.99 0.005 
Gender -0.02 0.09 0.98 0.817 -0.19 0.12 0.83 0.113 -0.02 0.09 0.99 0.868 
Black -0.73 0.17 0.48 0.000 -0.36 0.22 0.70 0.103 -0.74 0.18 0.48 0.000 
Hispanic 0.11 0.18 1.12 0.518 0.52 0.25 1.69 0.034 0.39 0.19 1.48 0.038 
Education 0.21 0.03 1.23 0.000 0.19 0.03 1.21 0.000 0.20 0.03 1.22 0.000 
Party  -0.69 0.03 0.50 0.000 -0.50 0.04 0.61 0.000 -0.57 0.03 0.57 0.000 
Polar Vortex 0.31 0.11 1.37 0.005 0.44 0.16 1.56 0.004 0.37 0.12 1.44 0.002 
Drought 0.39 0.09 1.48 0.000 0.25 0.12 1.28 0.046 0.20 0.09 1.22 0.033 
Hurricane 0.05 0.12 1.06 0.654 0.10 0.16 1.10 0.561 0.06 0.12 1.06 0.652 
Tornado -0.06 0.11 0.95 0.620 0.04 0.16 1.04 0.809 -0.05 0.11 0.95 0.673 
Flood 0.08 0.10 1.08 0.442 0.18 0.14 1.19 0.205 0.18 0.10 1.20 0.080 
Constant 1.809 0.213 6.105 0.000 1.894 0.29 6.645 0.000 2.002 0.22 7.406 0.000 
N 3009    1767    2939    
Nagelkerke R2 0.33    0.20    0.25    
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Table 2. Polar Vortex, Drought, and Climate Change Beliefs, across Education and Political Orientation 
 
 
 …Is Occurring …Due to Humans Scientists Agree 
 B S.E. Exp(B) p B S.E. Exp(B) p B S.E. Exp(B) p 
             
Age  -0.01 0.00 0.99 0.029 -0.01 0.00 0.99 0.004 -0.01 0.00 0.99 0.005 
Gender -0.02 0.09 0.98 0.793 -0.18 0.12 0.83 0.123 -0.02 0.09 0.98 0.828 
Black -0.67 0.17 0.51 0.000 -0.27 0.22 0.76 0.222 -0.69 0.18 0.50 0.000 
Hispanic 0.09 0.18 1.09 0.608 0.54 0.25 1.71 0.029 0.37 0.19 1.44 0.050 
Education 0.15 0.03 1.16 0.000 0.24 0.05 1.27 0.000 0.15 0.04 1.17 0.000 
Party  -0.61 0.04 0.54 0.000 -0.38 0.06 0.69 0.000 -0.51 0.04 0.60 0.000 
Polar Vortex 0.14 0.35 1.15 0.682 1.24 0.48 3.47 0.009 0.11 0.37 1.12 0.759 
Drought 0.56 0.27 1.74 0.038 0.98 0.35 2.67 0.005 0.37 0.28 1.45 0.186 
Hurricane 0.05 0.12 1.06 0.653 0.10 0.16 1.11 0.531 0.05 0.12 1.06 0.665 
Tornado -0.05 0.11 0.96 0.691 0.04 0.16 1.04 0.803 -0.04 0.12 0.96 0.730 
Flood 0.08 0.10 1.08 0.461 0.18 0.14 1.20 0.195 0.18 0.10 1.20 0.084 
Vortex X Edu 0.19 0.07 1.21 0.007 -0.09 0.09 0.92 0.356 0.17 0.07 1.19 0.016 
Vortex X Party -0.16 0.08 0.85 0.031 -0.18 0.10 0.84 0.073 -0.11 0.08 0.90 0.150 
Drought X Edu 0.06 0.05 1.07 0.228 -0.07 0.07 0.93 0.327 0.04 0.05 1.04 0.433 
Drought X Party -0.12 0.06 0.89 0.049 -0.19 0.08 0.83 0.018 -0.09 0.06 0.91 0.120 
Constant 1.76 0.24 5.81 0.000 1.43 0.33 4.16 0.000 1.96 0.25 7.12 0.000 
N 3009    1767    2939    
Nagelkerke R2 0.33    0.20    0.26    
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Table 3. Extreme Weather (Objective Indicators) and Climate Beliefs 
 
 
 …Is Occurring …Due to Humans Scientists Agree 
 B S.E. Exp(B) p B S.E. Exp(B) p B S.E. Exp(B) p 
             
Age -0.01 0.00 0.99 0.015 -0.01 0.00 0.99 0.001 -0.01 0.00 0.99 0.001 
Gender -0.06 0.09 0.94 0.495 -0.21 0.12 0.81 0.075 -0.05 0.09 0.95 0.571 
Black -0.84 0.16 0.43 0.000 -0.49 0.22 0.61 0.022 -0.79 0.17 0.45 0.000 
Hispanic 0.10 0.17 1.10 0.577 0.50 0.25 1.65 0.042 0.31 0.19 1.37 0.091 
Education 0.22 0.03 1.24 0.000 0.21 0.03 1.24 0.000 0.21 0.03 1.23 0.000 
Party -0.69 0.03 0.50 0.000 -0.50 0.04 0.61 0.000 -0.58 0.03 0.56 0.000 
Drought OBJ 0.21 0.23 1.24 0.343 -0.08 0.31 0.92 0.792 0.30 0.23 1.36 0.193 
Hurricane OBJ 0.21 0.22 1.23 0.348 -0.03 0.31 0.97 0.924 -0.12 0.22 0.89 0.592 
Tornado OBJ -0.26 0.17 0.78 0.141 -0.19 0.25 0.83 0.441 -0.17 0.18 0.84 0.324 
Flood OBJ 0.01 0.18 1.01 0.974 0.22 0.25 1.25 0.383 0.04 0.18 1.04 0.833 
Constant 2.11 0.20 8.26 0.000 2.24 0.28 9.36 0.000 2.30 0.21 9.97 0.000 
N 3020    1774    2950    
Nagelkerke R2 0.32    0.19    0.25    
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Table 4. Extreme Weather (Objective Indicators and Self-Reports) and Climate Beliefs 
 
 
 …Is Occurring …Due to Humans Scientists Agree 
 B S.E. Exp(B) p B S.E. Exp(B) p B S.E. Exp(B) p 
             
Age -0.01 0.00 0.99 0.034 -0.01 0.00 0.99 0.004 -0.01 0.00 0.99 0.006 
Gender -0.02 0.09 0.98 0.834 -0.19 0.12 0.83 0.117 -0.01 0.09 0.99 0.890 
Black -0.73 0.17 0.48 0.000 -0.36 0.22 0.70 0.103 -0.73 0.18 0.48 0.000 
Hispanic 0.08 0.18 1.08 0.657 0.53 0.25 1.69 0.034 0.36 0.19 1.44 0.053 
Education 0.20 0.03 1.22 0.000 0.19 0.04 1.21 0.000 0.20 0.03 1.22 0.000 
Party -0.69 0.03 0.50 0.000 -0.50 0.04 0.61 0.000 -0.57 0.03 0.57 0.000 
Drought OBJ 0.19 0.23 1.22 0.394 -0.04 0.32 0.96 0.889 0.31 0.24 1.37 0.182 
Hurricane OBJ 0.25 0.23 1.29 0.268 -0.07 0.32 0.93 0.826 -0.12 0.23 0.89 0.597 
Tornado OBJ -0.29 0.18 0.75 0.095 -0.22 0.25 0.80 0.386 -0.18 0.18 0.84 0.322 
Flood OBJ 0.02 0.18 1.02 0.900 0.25 0.26 1.28 0.334 0.02 0.18 1.02 0.912 
Tornado Self -0.03 0.11 0.98 0.822 0.04 0.16 1.04 0.826 -0.03 0.12 0.97 0.823 
Hurricane Self 0.02 0.12 1.02 0.870 0.09 0.17 1.10 0.578 0.06 0.13 1.06 0.630 
Drought Self 0.40 0.09 1.49 0.000 0.26 0.13 1.30 0.037 0.19 0.09 1.21 0.045 
Polar Vortex Self 0.31 0.11 1.37 0.005 0.44 0.16 1.55 0.005 0.37 0.12 1.45 0.001 
Flood Self 0.10 0.10 1.10 0.350 0.18 0.14 1.20 0.196 0.18 0.10 1.20 0.077 
Constant 1.86 0.22 6.39 0.000 1.91 0.29 6.72 0.000 2.03 0.22 7.59 0.000 
N 3009    1767    2939    
Nagelkerke R2 0.33    0.20    0.25    
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Table 5. Self-reported polar vortex experience within U.S. Census Regions 
 
 
  B S.E. Exp(B) p   B S.E. Exp(B) p 
Midwest Age -0.02 0.01 0.99 0.005 West Age -0.02 0.01 0.98 0.031 
 Gender -0.39 0.17 0.68 0.020  Gender -0.26 0.36 0.77 0.478 
 Black -0.50 0.36 0.61 0.161  Black -18.02 9622.58 0.00 0.999 
 Hispanic 0.09 0.48 1.10 0.848  Hispanic -1.54 1.04 0.22 0.138 
 Education 0.31 0.05 1.37 0.000  Education 0.29 0.12 1.34 0.014 
 Party -0.12 0.06 0.89 0.053  Party 0.12 0.14 1.12 0.392 
 Liberal News 0.22 0.09 1.25 0.014  Liberal News 0.35 0.15 1.42 0.017 
 Conservative News -0.02 0.10 0.98 0.826  Conservative News -0.09 0.23 0.91 0.691 
 Constant -0.35 0.40 0.71 0.386  Constant -3.20 0.92 0.04 0.001 
 N 708     N 771    
 Nagelkerke R2 0.16     Nagelkerke R2 0.10    
Northeast Age -0.02 0.01 0.98 0.001 South Age -0.02 0.01 0.98 0.000 
 Gender -0.47 0.19 0.63 0.013  Gender -0.19 0.18 0.83 0.296 
 Black -1.01 0.41 0.36 0.013  Black -1.74 0.44 0.18 0.000 
 Hispanic -0.95 0.43 0.39 0.027  Hispanic -2.06 0.73 0.13 0.005 
 Education 0.11 0.05 1.11 0.046  Education 0.22 0.05 1.24 0.000 
 Party -0.02 0.07 0.98 0.792  Party -0.20 0.07 0.82 0.004 
 Liberal News 0.11 0.10 1.11 0.268  Liberal News 0.02 0.09 1.02 0.797 
 Conservative News -0.13 0.12 0.88 0.247  Conservative News 0.15 0.10 1.16 0.143 
 Constant 0.37 0.43 1.45 0.389  Constant -0.36 0.42 0.70 0.393 
 N 543     N 1,003    
 Nagelkerke R2 0.09     Nagelkerke R2 0.13    
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Table 6. Predictors of drought self-reported experience 
 
 B S.E. Exp(B) p B S.E. Exp(B) p 
         
Drought OBJ 0.90 0.19 2.47 0.000 0.89 0.19 2.44 0.000 
Age 0.01 0.00 1.01 0.000 0.01 0.00 1.01 0.000 
Gender -0.14 0.08 0.87 0.080 -0.14 0.08 0.87 0.079 
Black -1.43 0.20 0.24 0.000 -1.43 0.20 0.24 0.000 
Hispanic 0.49 0.15 1.63 0.001 0.49 0.15 1.63 0.001 
Education 0.04 0.02 1.04 0.057 0.04 0.02 1.04 0.056 
Party 0.01 0.03 1.01 0.763 0.01 0.03 1.01 0.761 
Liberal News 0.14 0.04 1.15 0.000 0.14 0.04 1.15 0.000 
Conservative News -0.04 0.04 0.96 0.406 0.01 0.09 1.01 0.889 
Drought OBJ X Lib News     0.06 0.09 1.06 0.546 
Constant -0.98 0.19 0.38 0.000 -0.98 0.19 0.38 0.000 
N 3014    3014    
Nagelkerke R2 0.06    0.07    
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Table A1. OLS model for combined warming/anthropogenic belief measure 
 
 B S.E. Beta p 
(Constant) 3.81 0.10  .000 
Age 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.016 
Gender 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.904 
Black -0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.552 
Hispanic 0.19 0.07 0.04 0.007 
Education 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.086 
Party -0.28 0.02 -0.40 .000 
Flood -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.823 
Hurricane 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.107 
Tornado -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.466 
Polar Vortex -0.28 0.14 -0.11 0.048 
Liberal News 0.19 0.03 0.17 .000 
Conservative News -0.31 0.03 -0.28 .000 
Edu X Vortex 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.015 
Party X Vortex 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.186 
Drought 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.718 
Edu X Drought 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.476 
Party X Drought 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.733 
Lib News X Drought -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.519 
Con News X Drought 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.906 
Lib News X Vortex -0.08 0.04 -0.04 0.048 
Con News X Vortex -0.06 0.05 -0.03 0.178 
N    2411 
R2    0.47 
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Table A2. Education and political orientation interactions for all weather event categories 
 
 B S.E. Exp(B) p B S.E. Exp(B) p B S.E. Exp(B) p 
Age -0.01 0.00 0.99 0.028 -0.01 0.00 0.99 0.002 -0.01 0.00 0.99 0.005 
Gender -0.03 0.09 0.97 0.758 -0.20 0.12 0.82 0.103 -0.03 0.09 0.97 0.767 
Black -0.68 0.17 0.51 0.000 -0.25 0.22 0.78 0.257 -0.69 0.18 0.50 0.000 
Hispanic 0.08 0.18 1.08 0.661 0.54 0.25 1.72 0.029 0.36 0.19 1.43 0.056 
Education 0.14 0.04 1.15 0.001 0.19 0.06 1.21 0.001 0.15 0.04 1.16 0.000 
Party -0.61 0.05 0.54 0.000 -0.46 0.07 0.63 0.000 -0.54 0.05 0.58 0.000 
Polar Vortex 0.16 0.35 1.17 0.652 1.30 0.48 3.66 0.007 0.14 0.37 1.15 0.700 
Drought 0.53 0.27 1.70 0.049 0.94 0.35 2.55 0.008 0.35 0.28 1.42 0.216 
Flood 0.38 0.29 1.46 0.195 -0.44 0.39 0.65 0.260 0.25 0.31 1.28 0.425 
Hurricane -0.36 0.33 0.70 0.268 -0.66 0.44 0.52 0.134 -0.25 0.35 0.78 0.466 
Tornado -0.21 0.32 0.81 0.522 -0.20 0.44 0.82 0.651 -0.36 0.34 0.70 0.291 
Edu X Vortex 0.19 0.07 1.20 0.008 -0.09 0.09 0.91 0.325 0.18 0.07 1.19 0.016 
Edu X Drought 0.07 0.05 1.07 0.189 -0.06 0.07 0.95 0.420 0.05 0.05 1.05 0.367 
Edu X Flood -0.07 0.06 0.93 0.221 0.10 0.08 1.10 0.219 -0.07 0.06 0.94 0.276 
Edu X Hurricane 0.08 0.07 1.09 0.236 0.15 0.10 1.16 0.124 0.08 0.07 1.08 0.282 
Edu X Tornado 0.07 0.07 1.07 0.325 -0.05 0.09 0.95 0.552 0.03 0.07 1.03 0.693 
Party X Hurricane 0.04 0.08 1.04 0.574 0.10 0.11 1.10 0.379 0.01 0.08 1.02 0.853 
Party X Tornado -0.02 0.07 0.98 0.809 0.16 0.10 1.18 0.114 0.07 0.07 1.07 0.342 
Party X Flood -0.02 0.07 0.98 0.779 0.11 0.09 1.12 0.240 0.05 0.07 1.05 0.473 
Party X Vortex -0.17 0.08 0.85 0.029 -0.19 0.10 0.83 0.061 -0.12 0.08 0.89 0.123 
Party X Drought -0.11 0.06 0.89 0.059 -0.19 0.08 0.83 0.018 -0.10 0.06 0.91 0.118 
Constant 1.80 0.26 6.04 0.000 1.83 0.36 6.26 0.000 2.07 0.27 7.96 0.000 
N    3009    1767    2939 
Nagelkerke R2    0.33    0.21    0.26 
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Table A3. Polar Vortex, Drought, and Climate Change Beliefs, across Education, Political Orientation, and Media Use 
 
 B S.E. Exp(B) p B S.E. Exp(B) p B S.E. Exp(B) p 
Age 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.450 -0.01 0.00 0.99 0.046 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.874 
Gender -0.09 0.09 0.92 0.349 -0.16 0.12 0.85 0.195 -0.12 0.09 0.89 0.210 
Black -0.65 0.17 0.52 0.000 -0.20 0.23 0.82 0.375 -0.66 0.18 0.52 0.000 
Hispanic 0.14 0.18 1.15 0.420 0.57 0.25 1.77 0.023 0.43 0.19 1.54 0.024 
Education 0.11 0.04 1.12 0.002 0.18 0.05 1.20 0.000 0.13 0.04 1.13 0.001 
Party -0.46 0.04 0.63 0.000 -0.24 0.06 0.79 0.000 -0.36 0.05 0.70 0.000 
Polar Vortex -0.42 0.38 0.66 0.270 0.90 0.51 2.46 0.077 -0.25 0.39 0.78 0.534 
Drought 0.26 0.28 1.30 0.355 0.83 0.36 2.30 0.022 0.08 0.29 1.08 0.787 
Hurricane 0.10 0.13 1.11 0.409 0.14 0.17 1.15 0.422 0.11 0.13 1.12 0.383 
Tornado -0.02 0.12 0.98 0.873 0.12 0.17 1.13 0.461 0.00 0.12 1.00 0.980 
Flood 0.07 0.11 1.07 0.505 0.20 0.15 1.22 0.175 0.19 0.11 1.21 0.084 
Liberal News 0.59 0.08 1.80 0.000 0.35 0.10 1.42 0.000 0.45 0.09 1.57 0.000 
Conservative News -0.50 0.08 0.61 0.000 -0.59 0.12 0.55 0.000 -0.54 0.07 0.59 0.000 
Edu X Vortex 0.19 0.08 1.21 0.011 -0.05 0.10 0.96 0.630 0.18 0.08 1.19 0.019 
Party X Vortex -0.01 0.09 0.99 0.865 -0.16 0.11 0.85 0.146 0.00 0.09 1.00 0.988 
Edu X Drought 0.07 0.06 1.08 0.180 -0.05 0.07 0.96 0.534 0.05 0.06 1.05 0.371 
Party X Drought -0.04 0.07 0.96 0.513 -0.18 0.09 0.84 0.043 -0.02 0.07 0.98 0.763 
Lib News X Drought 0.04 0.13 1.04 0.760 0.13 0.14 1.14 0.357 0.04 0.13 1.04 0.741 
Con News X Drought -0.12 0.11 0.89 0.304 0.08 0.18 1.08 0.654 -0.09 0.10 0.92 0.393 
Lib News X Vortex 0.01 0.16 1.01 0.950 -0.03 0.17 0.97 0.840 0.17 0.17 1.19 0.322 
Con News X Vortex -0.39 0.15 0.68 0.009 -0.02 0.23 0.98 0.942 -0.02 0.13 0.98 0.871 
Constant 1.16 0.25 3.19 0.000 0.98 0.35 2.66 0.005 1.34 0.26 3.82 0.000 
N             
Nagelkerke R2    0.41    0.26    0.33 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
Table A4. Extreme Weather (Objective Indicators Time Splits) and Climate Beliefs 
 
 B S.E. Exp(B) p B S.E. Exp(B) p B S.E. Exp(B) p 
Age -0.01 0.00 0.99 0.013 -0.01 0.00 0.99 0.001 -0.01 0.00 0.99 0.001 
Gender -0.06 0.09 0.94 0.457 -0.22 0.12 0.81 0.069 -0.05 0.09 0.95 0.539 
Black -0.86 0.16 0.43 0.000 -0.50 0.22 0.61 0.021 -0.80 0.17 0.45 0.000 
Hispanic 0.08 0.18 1.09 0.637 0.46 0.25 1.59 0.059 0.31 0.19 1.37 0.095 
Education 0.22 0.03 1.24 0.000 0.21 0.03 1.24 0.000 0.21 0.03 1.23 0.000 
Party -0.69 0.03 0.50 0.000 -0.50 0.04 0.61 0.000 -0.58 0.03 0.56 0.000 
Drought OBJ_T1 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.713 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.245 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.299 
Hurricane OBJ_T1 -0.03 0.27 0.97 0.908 0.46 0.43 1.58 0.290 -0.18 0.27 0.84 0.513 
Tornado OBJ_T1 0.08 0.17 1.08 0.633 0.04 0.24 1.04 0.866 0.05 0.17 1.05 0.787 
Flood OBJ_T1 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.812 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.110 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.331 
Hurricane OBJ_T2 0.73 0.37 2.08 0.046 -0.44 0.50 0.64 0.371 0.29 0.36 1.34 0.420 
Tornado OBJ_T2 0.02 0.16 1.02 0.900 0.09 0.23 1.09 0.715 -0.09 0.16 0.92 0.590 
Flood OBJ_T2 -0.28 0.17 0.75 0.092 -0.10 0.24 0.91 0.695 -0.15 0.17 0.87 0.395 
Constant 2.25 0.22 9.52 0.000 2.37 0.30 10.73 0.000 2.32 0.23 10.15 0.000 
N     3020    1774    2950 
Nagelkerke R2    0.32    0.19    0.25 
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Table A5. Polar vortex self-report, by demographics, partisanship, and region 
 
 B S.E. Exp(B) p 
Age -0.02 0.003 0.98 .000 
Gender -0.361 0.099 0.697 .000 
Black -1.039 0.22 0.354 .000 
Hispanic -0.898 0.257 0.407 .000 
Education 0.221 0.029 1.248 .000 
Party -0.097 0.037 0.907 0.008 
Liberal News 0.137 0.049 1.147 0.005 
Conservative News -0.002 0.058 0.998 0.975 
Northeast 2.6 0.199 13.469 .000 
Midwest 2.613 0.195 13.64 .000 
South 1.522 0.197 4.581 .000 
Constant -2.409 0.287 0.09 .000 
N    3025 
Nagelkerke R2    0.25 
     
 
 
 
 
 
